Blog by Shlomi Noach
MySQL’s security model is not as elaborate as other popular databases. It’s missing quite a lot.
I wish to point out what I think are some very disturbing security holes, which may affect the database integrity.
This post is not about Roles, Kerberos, IPs and such. It’s about simple MySQL features, which allow common, unprivileged users, to break data integrity by using unprotected session variables.
I will consider three such issues.
In Triggers Use Case Compilation, Part I, I’ve demonstrated some triggers use scenarios.
We continue our examples of triggers usage.
Consider the City table: each city belongs to a certain country. Some questions we may be interested in are:
Answering any of these questions is an easy SQL excercise. But aggregation is required, and full table scan (or full index scan, if we’re lucky) is essentially part of any execution plan. What if we can’t pay the price for these queries? What if we need immediate, or near immediate response?
I thought this deserves more than a comment on my previous post on the subject, in which I expressed the opinion that sql_mode is undesired.
Back to reality: sql_mode is here right now. What else can be done?
Is there anything to do about sql_mode? I believe so: make it strict by default.
sql_mode must be one of the most elusive issues in setting up a MySQL database. It is also responsible for difficulties in migration, upgrading and securing of databases.
MySQL usually has little issues with migrating database from one machine to another, one version to another, one OS to another, one architecture to another. If we’re not sure, we can always migrate using mysqldump’s logical dump, right?
Not entirely right. The elusive sql_mode (empty by default) may affect out backup+restore, may affect our application behavior, may affect our data integrity. Continue reading » “Do we need sql_mode?”
I’ve run by quite a few triggers lately on production systems. In previous posts, I’ve written about problems solved with triggers. So here’s a compilation of some solutions based on triggers; and some problems which are not (yet?) solvable due to current triggers limitations.
Triggers can be used to:
Triggers are not fast. In fact, they can add quite an overhead if misused. Some of the triggers presented here are known to work on real life production systems, though, and work well. But make sure you benchmark before embarking on extensive application changes. Continue reading » “Triggers Use Case Compilation, Part I”
Web applications face constant exploitation attempts. Those with a user base must keep their users’ private data, well… private.
While the MySQL security model allows restricting users access to databases, tables and even columns, it has no built in feature for restricting the rows access within the given table.
One cannot allow a user to only update rows 0 through 99, but restrict that user from updating rows 100 to 199. Such restrictions are usually managed in the application level, by adding a necessary “… AND filtering_column = some_value…”
Many web application have the notion of an ‘admin’ account, or several such accounts, which provide greater control over the application. The ‘admin’ account is one account to which many attacks are targeted. One such attack is an attempt to modify the admin’s password, such that the attacker can later log in with and access restricted data. Continue reading » “Using triggers to block malicious code: an example”